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Palavras Chave BGP, redes, segurança, encaminhamento, deteção
Resumo A utilização diária da Internet tornou-se uma rotina que foi assimilada pelas
pessoas sem considerarem a complexidade interna desta gigante rede. Até
um certo ponto, o Border Gateway Protocol é o que mantem toda esta conec-
tividade possível apesar de ser um protocolo defeituoso por natureza.
Em 2008, um ataque Man-In-The-Middle foi pela primeira vez apresentado ao
grande público e desde de então mais técnicas para explorar este protocolo
e obter tráfego alheio de forma ilícita foram dadas a conhecer. Mesmo que o
desvio não aconteça com natureza maliciosa, mas sim devido a um erro de
configuração, este é um problema que deverá ser enfrentado.
Alguns provedores de serviço e institutos de investigação já apresentaram
propostas para novos protocolos e/ou sistemas de monitorização, mas estes
estão atrasados no seu desenvolvimento ou apenas afetam a camada supe-
rior da rede, deixando utilizadores e um grande número de empresas que
estão ligadas a um provedor sem meios para agir e sem informação sobre o
encaminhamento do seu tráfego.
Nesta dissertação, é apresentado, concebido e implementado um sistema
que atinge uma monitorização ativa do BGP através da medição do tempo
médio de viagem de vários pacotes enviados de várias localizações, através
de uma rede mundial de sondas, e do processamento dos resultados obtidos,
permitindo que todos os interessados possam ser alertados.

Keywords BGP, networking, security, routing, detection
Abstract The daily use of the Internet has become a routine that many people absorbed
into their lives without even thinking about the insides of this gigantic network.
To an extent, the Border Gateway Protocol is what is keeping all this connec-
tivity together despite being a very flawed protocol due to its design.
In 2008 a Man-In-The-Middle attack was first presented to the general audi-
ence and ever since more techniques were reported to use the protocol to
obtain traffic illicitly. Even if the routing deviation does not occur via a mali-
cious intention but due to some poorly configured router, this is a problem that
must be tackled.
Some network providers and research institutes already presented some
drafts for new protocols or monitoring systems but they are late into deploy-
ment or only affect the top layer of the network, leaving users and most part
of the companies connected to the provider impotent and without any proper
information about the routing of their traffic.
In this dissertation a system is presented, implemented and deployed, achiev-
ing an active monitorization of BGP through measurements of the average
travel time of several packets sent to various locations by a worldwide set of
Probes and the collected results processed allowing all concerned actors to
be alerted.
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chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 motivation
The Border Gateway Protocol is the protocol in place to connect the Internet in modern days.
However, it is a protocol flawed by design in terms of security, which leaves users helpless in case of
a detour of their traffic. These defects presented by the protocol affect the confidentiality of data,
availability of the communications and integrity of service, usually known as the Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad of security[1]. Despite existing some solutions and systems that
can be employed by network providers and some major corporations, everyday users and companies
are exposed to the flaws that inherently exist.
Even if the user is able to detect that his traffic is being rerouted, he can not act on a network
level leaving his options reduced to warning his provider and use a higher level of security policies
such as the termination of incoming and outgoing data transfers and the usage of encryption in public
services that are not using it already.
1.2 objectives
This dissertation is part of the DARTEG (Deteção de Ataques de Redirecionamento de Tráfego a
uma Escala Global) project[2] and it was developed in the Aveiro site of Instituto de Telecomunicações
in the research area of the Advanced Telecommunications and Networks Group (ATNoG)[3]. Alongside
to this dissertation, student Mário Pina was also developing his Masters’ dissertation in the same field
with connections to this work. During the various chapters, his name and work will be referenced
when necessary.
The ambition of this work is to implement and deploy a worldwide monitoring system that is
able to detect Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) traffic redirections based only on the Round Trip
Time (RTT) for each monitored network. The monitorization should be based on a set of Probes
deployed in several locations and the measurements should be reported to a central location who acts
as a Server and also hosts a website that allows connection by authorised users.
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The processing of the results obtained by the various probes should be sensible enough to correctly
correlate the past measurements to the incoming result and detect consistent consecutive deviations
from the estimated average.
Concerning the Probes operation, they do not require much capabilities or resources, which allow
their deployment to be done in Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) spread through various datacenters,
which is vital to guarantee a worldwide coverage and a correct detection of routing attacks, since they
can only be seen by probes sufficiently apart from the monitored network and/or the attack point.
1.3 structure
This first chapter gives an introductory explanation to this dissertation and it is complemented by
chapter 2 where the BGP is explained, including its features and flaws, how they can be exploited
and what can be done to prevent it. Some detection and alarming services are also explored in that
chapter.
In chapter 3 the implemented system is discussed, starting with a general view of the architecture
and the components of the system, before discussing the datamodel and proceeding to explain the
implementation of those concepts for every component.
Lastly, chapter 4 looks at the Probes used to obtain Results in this dissertation, as well as the
Targets that were monitored, before looking at some Results to try and draw relevant conclusions.
Chapter 5 wraps the whole dissertation and gives a look at what is ahead of it.
2
chapter 2
State of the Art
2.1 the Border Gateway Protocol
The BGP is the standard of the current Internet routing and is used as the de facto protocol[4]
for connecting the Internet. It was built using all the experience gained during the development and
usage of the External Gateway Protocol (the protocol EGP should not be confused with the family of
protocols with the same name) and came into development to replace it.
Despite being projected to work as an Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP), BGP can also work as
an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), as shown in figure 2.1 (adapted from [5]), but the internal aspect
of the protocol will not be covered in this work because it is not prone to the hijacking attacks that
are discussed later. From this point onward, whenever BGP is mentioned it should be assumed that it
refers to the External part of the protocol.
Figure 2.1: External and Internal BGP
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The version 4 of BGP lists the primary function of BGP as a mechanism of information exchange
between several BGP-speaking systems[6], also known as Autonomous Systems, which Hawkinson, J.
et al defined as "a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run by one or more network operators
which has a SINGLE and CLEARLY DEFINED routing policy" in RFC 1930[7]. These Autonomous
System (AS) are identified by an Autonomous System Number (ASN) that can be any number between
1 and 64511 for public ASN and 64512 and 65355 for private ones. Because this is a finite range
of ASNs a later proposal was published[8] to extend from 2 bytes to 4 bytes ASN under the format
<higher 2 bytes in decimal>[dot]<lower 2 bytes in decimal> but for the purpose of this dissertation
the 2 bytes format is used.
BGP operates on the Internet by constructing the reachability table and the network graph
according to the information contained in the announcements from other BGP-speaking routers (also
called Border Router (BR)) containing the routes to reach others AS, leaving to the receiving router
the decision on each route to take, based on some rules as the most-specific IP prefix or the length (in
number of hops) of the route. These announcements are made in the UPDATE messages and contain
a set of attributes, where the mandatory ones are:
Origin - How the router learned the route. 0 for Internal, 1 for External and 2 for incomplete or
unknown origin.
Next Hop - The Internet Protocol (IP) address that should be used for reach the announced AS. If
BGP is working as an IGP this attribute should be propagated and not modified.
AS Path - List of all AS that passed the announcement and form the path to reach the original ASes.
Whenever a router receives an announcement and redistributes it to his peers it prepends his
ASN to the path already present in the message.
An important aspect that will be explored later is that, in order to avoid loops in the announcement
transmission, whenever a router sees an route announcement with his own ASN in the message, the
router just discards the packet.
Any two BR that form a connection are called, in a general way, neighbours but the connections
could be of three types[9][10]:
Peer-Peer - Mostly on the core of the Internet, these neighbours pass traffic without expecting
monetary compensation but do not announce each other routes to transit or other peers.
Customer-Provider - The customer pays the service provider to be able to announce his routes and
transit traffic to the rest of the Internet.
Sibling-Sibling - When two AS are administrated by the same company or authority they can pass
traffic without limitations.
These definitions are an important concept to define the valley-free property of the BGP routing,
which represents the idea that a route that passes through a Provider-Customer or a Peer-Peer edge
should not transverse another Peer-Peer edge or Customer-Provider edge. This is a relevant notion for
the later discussion of BGP hijacking. Figure 2.2 (adapted from [11]) illustrates a route that breaks
this property and is, in fact, the original Proof-of-Concept done by Pilosov and Kapela (In section 2.2
this attack is studied with more detail).
As said before, the relevant information for the creation of BGP paths are sent in the UPDATE
messages. These messages contain multiple fields that can be used to indicate routes that are no longer
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Figure 2.2: Route breaking the "valley-free" property of BGP
acceptable or new routes in the network. The new routes are sent in a field called Network Layer
Reachability Information (NLRI). When a new route is perceived by a router, it should add its own
ASN to the AS Path before redistributing the route. Alongside with the new routes, a router can
also announce several attributes that are not the well-known mandatory ones presented before. One
of the attributes that is important to look at, is the Communities attribute and this is classified as
an Optional Transitive attribute, that may not be supported by all BGP implementations. However,
when it is, it could be used for BGP hijacking, as seen later in the text.
Communities can be simply described as a set of routes who share some property and are grouped
to simplify the routing policy application[12]. This attribute is designed to work as a 32-bit value, but
some of the values are advised to be treated as reserved. Also, there are 3 values that are global to
every AS:
NO_EXPORT (0xFFFFFF01) - This route or group of routes should not be carried to outsiders
of a BGP confederation (an AS sub-divided into internal ASs for administration purposes[13]).
NO_ADVERTISE (0xFFFFFF02) - This route or group of routes should not be carried to any
BGP peers.
NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED (0xFFFFFF03) - This route or group of routes should not be
carried to any BGP peers outside of the AS even if they are part of the BGP confederation.
Later in this chapter, a form of attack on BGP will use the aforementioned global communities.
2.2 BGP vulnerabilities
With the major aspects of the protocol presented, it is an obvious understanding that BGP was
not implemented with security concerns in mind. This created some long-lasting vulnerabilities that
are not solvable, only monitarable[14]. All BGP transactions are based on trust[15] and in recent
years there was an increase in BGP hijackings caused by either erroneous configurations or malicious
intents[16]. These problems impose as a major threat because there is not a great level of awareness to
them and the high quantity of UPDATE messages in circulation (in 2009 Renesys[14] reported more
than 45.000 UPDATES per minute). With no mechanism for authenticating these messages, anyone
with a minimum expertise can forge BGP announcements and insert new routes into the network or
produce false AS paths.
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However, not all of the redirections that happen on the Internet are illegitimate. One of the
challenges of BGP hijacking detection is the detection between perfectly normal redirections, like
traffic engineering or physical causes (hardware failures[17], natural causes[18]) and abnormal ones
(malicious intents or erroneous configurations[19]). Nonetheless, this kind of BGP attacks are not the
first ones to occur and certainly will not be the last ones. Attackers, hackers or simply networking
professionals already use techniques such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), where the intruder
tries to disrupt the access from the user to the system either by overloading the network connectivity
or the server’s resources[20], or Domain Name System (DNS) blocks (such as the "Great Firewall of
China") where the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or governmental agencies can inject false registries
to conduct users to the wrong location[21], thus blocking the access to legitimate sites (for example,
blocking Twitter or YouTube for censorship purposes).
When talking about BGP attacks, hijacking is a general way to refer three types of attacks:
Blackholing - Similar to DNS blocks, attackers can receive the traffic intended for the victim and
drop it (to Null0 interface, for example), cutting the flow of information. [4] [22]
Impersonating - When the attackers pose as the victim, either by answering to the hijacked traffic
or using the announced IP prefixes to send spam e-mails. [4]
Interception - Our main concern, the attackers receives the traffic and can read it (and even modify
it) before sending it to the original destination[22]. Interception attacks are generally invisible
to the victim and were complex to perform due to the fact that is necessary to have a clean
path to the victim during the attack. In 2008, Pilosov and Kapela presented their Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attack [9] in which a new way to do this ’clean path’ was introduced.
Interception attacks work by capturing the traffic intended to the victim, just like in Blackholing
or Impersonating, but directing it to the intended receiver after reading and/or modifying it. In
2014, Renesys reported knowing at least three methods to perform this[23], which include Pilosov
and Kapela’s Man-In-The-Middle, an approach which uses the Communities attribute of BGP and,
finally, a technique that explores the announcements only to peers and not to providers in order to
take advantage of the blockage to free transit. Starting with MITM, the first step is to convince the
remaining ASes that our announcement is the correct one and, most importantly, the best route to
the announced IP prefix. This can be accomplished by winning the race conditions that happen at
BGP tables, such as the most specific prefix (i.e., a /16 is more specific than a /8, and so the routers
should choose it) or the shorter route in terms of size of AS Path. There are more attributes that can
influence this choice (Cisco has a Best Path Algorithm [24] with 13 conditions and Juniper has 15
condition [25], for example) but this are the most used ones when someone tries to win ("Winning" is
defined as gaining the best route to legit announcer) the possession of routes. [9]
The problem exists when trying to do this poisoning of other BGP routers without taking in
consideration the delivery of traffic to the original destination. An untreated announcement can lead
to every packet that is sent out to be returned in a short period of time because everyone else thinks
that the route to reach the attacked AS is that one. Pilosov and Kapela use the no loop property of
AS Paths to keep a clean path to the victim, analysing the traceroute result and noting which ASN
should be prepended to the AS Path. This will cause that when the path that should be clear receives
the UPDATE message with the route being hijacked, it will drop that packet because his own ASN is
already in it. The final step in the process is to create a static route to the first AS in the "fake" AS
Path, redirecting the traffic to the original destination. In figures 2.3 to 2.7 (adapted from [14]), is
6
Figure 2.3: Pilosov and Kapela’s MITM: Legit announcement
described a hypothetical Man-In-The-Middle attack: AS 200, our victim, starts by announcing himself
to his neighbours (figure 2.3), who propagate the announcement to the whole network (figure 2.4)
before everyone converges and the best path for each router is chosen (figure 2.5).
At this point, the attacker must analyse the traceroute to the intended target so that he can
prepare the malicious announcement with the ASN of the ASes in the path prepend to the AS Path,
making the routers in that path discard the packets (figure 2.6). Finally, after the false announcement
is propagated, almost everyone in the network is sending the packets, intended to the victim, to the
attacker who then redirects it to the victim using the clear path that was preserved (figure 2.7).
Despite all the preparation done before launching the attack, it is relatively easy to detect the
hijacking with a simple traceroute that would expose the addresses that the traffic crossed until
returning to the original destination. Hijackers can perform a TTL adjusting, which will erase the
"new" routers from the traceroute and, with some success, mask the presence of the attacker. This can
be achieved by adding enough values to TTL so that the traceroutes do not show the unwanted steps
between the sender and the victim [9].
The method, however, does not impact one important aspect of the traffic, which is the time factor.
Because BGP uses the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions to communicate, it is possible
to determine the time between transmission using the ACK messages, thus, showing a large jump in
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Figure 2.4: Pilosov and Kapela’s MITM: Announcement propagation
times when the TTL masking is used and the reroute is big enough to be noticed. In figure 2.8 [9] we
can see the complete path that was done by the traffic in the original attack demonstrated, by Pilosov
and Kapela, where all the traffic that was destined to DEFCON was rerouted to Pilosoft servers in
Los Angeles. When TTL masking was applied, as shown in figure 2.9 [9], 10 steps were erased from
the records, but the time is still the same, making it an easy task to a person or system who looks into
the results to detect a jump between 28 and 88 msecs [14]. In 2014, Renesys believed that this type of
technique was still to be used outside of a testing or proof-of-concept utilisation [23].
Another technique that is reported is the use of BGP Communities to restrict the announcements
to upstream providers, making the hijack confined to a certain spatial limit and consists in a riskier
approach, since it is needed to fully understand Communities and the way they aggregate and treat
announcements. The way this is done is to announce the desired routes using the P:71990 community,
which is of the type P:7DNNA [23] [26] being disclosed by WHOIS databases to be a type of community
that prevents prefix propagation, where D indicates which peers are blocked in the propagation (1 for
international peers and 2 for in-country peers), NN specifies the upstreams (99 stands for all providers
while the others numbers represent individual providers) and A defines the action and only takes the
value 0 (Do not announce prefix) [23] [26].
The last procedure that was reported [23] involves doing the announcements only to peers and
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Figure 2.5: Pilosov and Kapela’s MITM: Network convergence
not to clients, providers or siblings. Since the peers, per definition, do not transit traffic or redirect
announcements, this will have the same effect that the Communities approach and limit the hijacking
to nearby Autonomous Systems [23] [26].
Nonetheless, having the knowledge to perform these attacks on the BGP network does not
automatically endangers the protocol or its speakers, forcing the attackers to gain access to the network,
either directly or remotely. Direct access can be gained by someone who works near the physical
routers or someone who infiltrates the locations where the routers are located, while remote access
depends (almost always) on some kind of malicious attack that allows the control of the feed. One of
the most popular mechanisms to do this, is the Trojan Horse, a piece of software that can dissimulate
himself as a legit program to the user and performs malicious actions without his knowledge. [27]
In recent year, this Trojans became more specific to deal with the new ways that people browse the
Internet, promoting the appearance of "socially engineered Trojans". Apart from Trojans, attackers
can also use bugs or failures in the software used in the computers, phishing attacks perpetrated by
email or some form of malicious code like viruses, worms and malware [28].
The above mentioned mechanisms and attacks are all in a theoretical perspective. According
to Dyn Research (previously Renesys), 2013 was the year that marked the debut of these attacks
on the Internet, with more than 150 cities containing at least one victim of attacks [29]. Since
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Figure 2.6: Pilosov and Kapela’s MITM: False announcement
then several hijacks, intentional or not, have been detected nearly every month, in several locations,
including Portugal. One of the most serious cases happened in March 2013 when Vega (an Ukrainian
telecommunications provider) started the hijack on prefixes owned by the United Kingdom Atomic
Weapons Establishment and the traffic that should directly link Houston, Texas, United States, to the
United Kingdom started to take a detour to Frankfurt, Germany, and Kiev, Ukraine, before being
returned to the original destination. The hijack lasted close to 90 minutes and it hijacked more than
150 prefixes, where the AWE ones were included. Apart from those, Vega was announcing erroneous
prefixes over the course of 5 days and included companies like Walmart, Pepsi Co., the Royal Mail,
The Football Association, banks, telecommunications companies, and others[30]. Other incidents were
already reported by the same company (Dyn Research), some of which include international traffic
like Guadalajara, Mexico to Washington D.C., United States being relayed to Moscow, Russia and
Minsk, Belarus before returning to America, or Chicago, Illinois, United States to Tehran, Iran doing a
complicated path before arriving at the original destination (figure 2.10). There are, however, reported
cases of hijacking happening in traffic flowing in the same city. In 2013, traffic that should transverse
two locations in Denver, Colorado, United States, took a huge deviation and choose a path that crossed
London, United Kingdom and Reykjavik, Iceland. This is one of the episodes in a larger hijack detected
between July 31 and August 19, 2013, that originated in Iceland in 17 distinct times. [29]
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Figure 2.7: Pilosov and Kapela’s MITM: Hijacking in progress
Figure 2.8: BGP hijacking without TTL masking
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Figure 2.9: BGP hijacking with TTL masking
Figure 2.10: Example of an hijacked route
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2.3 securing BGP
What can be done to prevent the hijacks? Some solutions were already proposed and partially
implemented, ranging from updated protocols (BGPSEC, SBGP, So-BGP) to cryptographic signatures
on the packets (RPKI) or simple methods that can be implemented by the providers in their own
infrastructure, like prefix filtering. All of the mentioned mechanisms can be considered to be active
solutions but there are also some methods of passive monitoring that aim to monitor the Internet and
BGP announcements and detect erroneous UPDATES messages.
The most radical of solutions would be changing the protocol to a new or updated one that could
support verified announcements or cryptographically signed packets. Some tentatives were already
made, in the likes of, but not limited to:
Secure BGP (S-BGP) - Development started in 1997 [31], aims to be a three-way method, that
applies the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a new BGP transitive attribute and IPsec
to authenticate and encrypt the packets. The PKI consists of various mechanism, policies and
procedures that support two main components, the Certification Authorities and the Public
Key Cryptography, in order to ensure a secure communication for people or organisations over
the Internet. [32] This infrastructure, applied to S-BGP, authenticates the IP blocks being
announced, as well as the AS owner and the BGP routes in the UPDATE message. The new
attribute is used to contain the digital signatures to attest the validity of the announcement,
together with the PKI information. Finally, IPsec assures the correct encryption for the packets
that transverse the Internet, the data integrity and the authentication between BGP routers.
[33] [34]
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) - Another proposal was made by engineers working at Cisco and it
was baptised as the Secure Origin BGP. It is based on the notion of digital certificates, making
use of three types of certificates to ensure the secure communication between BGP speakers
and it adds a new type of message to BGP called SECURITY message. This message will
transmit all information that regards the certificates and creates backwards compatibility, since
it does not modify any existing message type. Using this messages, the soBGP speakers will
trade certificates called Entity Certificates (to ensure the identity of the speaker), Authorization
Certificates (to assign IP prefix blocks to the routers) and Policy Certificates (to pass policies for
the prefixes between routers on the network). [35] While S-BGP is a more complete and robust
solution, soBGP is a much lighter one, existing a trade-off between security and computation
time that should be analysed by actors concerned with those protocols. [34]
BGPsec - The most recent, BGPsec, bases some ideas on S-BGP, including the use of cryptographic
keys to ensure the correct transmission of routes through BGP speakers. Using a Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI), BGPsec proposes a way to secure route propagation where each
speaker signs his messages, creating a set of nested signed messages when the announcements
are spread through the Internet. The RPKI also does the association between ASN and IP
blocks, causing a chain of trust in conjunction with the signed messages. After having his blocks
in the RPKI, an AS can associate a Route Origination Authorization (ROA), i.e. a special
signed block issued by the RPKI to the specific AS, to an announcement. The ROAs, the signed
nested messages and the RPKI create a simple yet robust method to secure the AS Path and
provide some security to the protocol. [36] [37]
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These solutions were designed to be applied on the ISP-controlled side of the network, but while
they are in a development process there are other measures that can be applied. One example is prefix
filtering or route filtering, where AS administrators can enforce rules that prevent their routers to
accept announcements that contain erroneous or suspicious information. The basic rule is to filter the
prefixes that the AS owns, but even that one is sometimes ignored. [9] Apart from that one, ASes
can start filtering using databases like the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), that will cover some, but
not all, cases, which provide some degree of associations between ASN and IP blocks. However, these
databases are publicly accessible and anyone can insert data into them, making them not 100 percent
trustworthy. Even if the administrators do not filter the inbound traffic, they can start filtering the
outbound traffic, preventing the spread of erroneous configuration on their side. If everyone filters
their traffic the number of cases of unintentional hijack will drop, but, citing Pilosov and Kapela "Until
everyone filters everyone perfectly, this door is still open". [9]
Still on the ISP side of actions, there are some actions that can be taken but would generally imply
collaboration from two or more peers or an excessive amount of manual work. For example, the use
of TCP MD5 Authentication would allow two routers to exchange a BGP (since BGP sessions are
supported by TCP) message with an associated payload which has been digested by the MD5 algorithm.
The receiving router can digest the content of the message using the same technique and, in the end,
compare the result with the digest already in the message. If the results differ, the packet should be
dropped because it cannot be trusted. This, however, requires every set of peers to have a manually
configured set of keys to execute the digest and that those keys are changed periodically to minimise
the risk of attacks. This creates a whole lot of work for the network administrators, which creates
a barrier to be adopted by everyone. [38] Another solution, already explored when the BGPsec was
addressed, is the use of IPsec, either by using the Authentication Header (AH) or the Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP), to ensure a secure communication between neighbouring routers. Nonetheless,
this only tackles the local problems, not preventing route hijacking. Finally, Generalised TTL Security
Mechanism (GTSM) can intervene in the case of TTL adjusting (talked before, when the MITM by
Pilosov and Kapela was discussed) is used. Since BGP sessions use (generally) TTL = 1, because their
neighbours are, in most cases, in a distance of one hop, it is easy to modify this value to hide the
tracks of the attack. GTSM uses TTL = 255 (the maximum value for 8 bits) and when a router sees a
packet with TTL under 254, it drops it. But, as before, this does not prevent route hijacking on a
large scale, being only a small leverage in a large problem. [38]
Apart from the solutions that involve using the Network and/or the Transport layer of the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, some approaches have been presented over the years and
frequently they are some form of monitoring systems for the BGP announcements. For this type of
solution, it is important to distinguish between data-plane and control-plane solutions, based on the
information that they use to formulate the need or not to alert the owner of the AS. The former is
characterised by controlling the network, taking decisions based on previous policies, even if the data
is not flowing opposed to the latter which consists in directing the traffic and the packets when they
truly arrive at the router. Applied to the mentioned solutions, it can exist mechanisms that monitor
the Internet based on the policies in place or the data that is flowing on the BGP itself or even both.
Using only control plane information provides a solution that can be deployed with ease but can be
imprecise when analysing the network because of the lack of BGP data. Using only the data plane also
provides a fairly easy system to set up, but is limited by the number and position of the monitoring
probes. Lastly, a method that combines the two planes can perform a joint, real-time detection for
hijacks but is also limited (in the perspective of the accuracy) to the number and position of the probes.
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Table 2.1 (adapted from [39]) synthesises these points [39].
Requirement Control plane Data plane Control and Data plane
Real-time depending on the sources X X
Accurate X limited by vantage points limited by vantage points
Light-weight X X X
Easily deployable X X X
Table 2.1: Different types of BGP monitoring systems
Examples of this type of solutions are the PHAS [40] or the iSpy. [39] Nonetheless, the three types
described before have two major flaws: there is no real incentive to ISPs to deploy the systems, i.e., if
very few ASes are running the system there is no real monitoring in place, and they do not have a
notification system embedded by default, making the network administrators performing one more
task in their routine.
Another proposal is a system capable of performing what was called by the authors as "Promoting
and purging routes". In simpler terms, it takes advantage of the mesh of ASes to elect one or more
lifesaver routes that would send the correct routes to the infected neighbours. These routes are
identified using the RIPE MyASN service and after detecting an attack the lifesavers purge their own
BGP table and promote the routes on their neighbours taking advantage of the AS_SET attribute
where, by definition, no matter how many ASes are in the AS-Path, its size is always one, making the
promoted route have the minimum possible size. [41]
All these approaches share one idea, that the system has access to BGP data, either the inbound-
/outbound traffic or the network topology. But, what happen if a simple company signs a contract to an
ISP? There is no real information available to these types of situations, apart from that who depends
on the TCP rather than BGP itself (round trip time, time to live, traceroute). These companies rely
on some services that are offered by third-parties and range from the most basic, free, ones to some
services that are commercial level, with costs associated. Some examples of these services are the
Internet Alert Registry (discontinued) [42], RIPE NCC Routing Information Service [43], BGPmon
[44], Dyn’s Internet Intelligence [45] or Watchmy.NET [46]. They may contrast in some aspects, for
example, cost (free or paid), support (existence of a SLA or no assistance), response times (in a matter
of seconds or hours), data sources (how many and how disperse are the probes), accuracy (the rate of
false positives and/or false negatives), among others. [14]
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chapter 3
System Architecture and
Implementation
3.1 proposed solution and architecture
In this dissertation, it is proposed a solution based on a Server, built on a modular architecture, and
a variable number of Probes. In the Server, different modules will process the data and communicate
with each other in order to accomplish the desired monitorization of the BGP, in conjunction with
a variable number of Probes, spread worldwide, that will run Scripts uploaded via the website and
perform the necessary tests.
Approaching the solution with more detail, figure 3.1 shows the components that are already
deployed, how they connect with each other and the protocols or languages used to achieve this.
Starting with the User Module, it aims to store all the information about the users, validate their
credentials and permissions in order to give access to parts of the system, and communicate these
permissions to other components.
The website and the Graphical User Interface (GUI) use the functionalities provided by the module
mentioned before to allow users who are correctly logged in and have the necessary permissions to
view, edit, insert or delete data from the system.
Linked to the website but also used by other components, a Storage component allows the Scripts
that will be uploaded to be saved on the Server and a Logging component will store all the logs
generated by the different components in the course of their functions.
One of the central pieces of the whole system and that is linked to practically all other components
is the Database. The database will store all the information regarding Probes, Scripts, Results, Alarms
and any information generated by a conjunction of any of these.
The Probe Management component is responsible for all matters related to the Probes, either
by creating a new instance in the system, uploading Scripts to the Probes, checking if a Probe is
responsive, among other tasks. This component will interact with the Probes via Secure Shell (SSH)
and Secure Copy (SCP) (over the SSH channel) in order to provide a secure way of communication
between them.
After the Probes are configured and the Scripts running on them, it is necessary to have endpoints
on the Server to assure the correct reception of data. For that purpose, two components are in charge of
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of the system’s components
the communication with the Probes. The first one to be addressed is the Management Communication,
responsible for receiving data that concerns the utilisation of the Probes and its resources. This
component receives signals from Scripts that are monitoring the Probes and can make changes to the
data present in the Database, if necessary.
The second component that acts as an endpoint for Probe communication is the Result Communi-
cation, responsible for gathering the data taken by the Probes during the execution of the tests and
store in the database. After this data is stored, the Result Communication must be able to alert the
Result Management component that a new Result is ready to be analysed.
The aforementioned Result Management component, who also aggregates the Alarming component,
is in charge of processing the incoming Results, via Result Communication component, and based on
the data contained in them, setting up the relevant Alarms, either for one specific Target or for the
Probe who collected the Result.
All of these components are on the Server side of the system, but they need a set of Probes in
order to have meaningful information that allows their activity to be done. These Probes can be of a
variable number but it is important that they are geographically distant from each other to guarantee
a worldwide coverage. This is valuable, in the context of the BGP routing attacks, because Probes too
close to the attack can be blind to its occurrence. In figure 3.2 it is given a possible configuration of
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a set of Probes and it shows the occurrence of a cluster of Probes, this is, two Probes in the same
location. When this happens, one of them can be set as a Backup and, in the case of failure by the
Active Probe, the Management Communication component can switch their roles in order to maintain
a monitorization in that region.
Figure 3.2: Diagram of the Probes connected to the Central Server
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3.2 data model
To store all the data necessary for the project, a datamodel was designed in order to accomodate
all the needs for every component and over the course of the project, the tables and columns of
each table were iterated to reflect the state of the development. The diagram shown in Figure 3.3
acts as a Relational diagram, showing the tables and relations between them. In this diagram, it is
already possible to observe implementation-specific concepts, such as Django’s tables and, as such,
the datatypes presented were generated by Django to better accommodate the Model definition in
MariaDB, as it will be discussed ahead in section 3.3.
It is worth noting, that all tables have a numeric integer ID that serves as the primary key for
that table. For this point onward, this field is implicit when talking about a table.
Starting with the tables generated by default at the start of a Django project, and that were used
in this project (more about that in subsection 3.3.1), there are three tables worthy of mention. The
Group table stores the name of each Group of users. A Group is a simple way of giving permission to
a set of Users, instead of having to do it one by one. Linked to the Group, the table for User Groups
does the association between a Group ID and a User ID and is the table that stores the information of
what Users are in which Group. Finally, the User table stores all the data relevant to the User in the
system like the password of the User, date of his last login, first and last name, username and email
that are provided at the register and the date were the User joined the system. It also contains three
verification fields to check if the User is considered a Superuser (subsection 3.3.1), Staff or if the User
is Active.
The User table is a fundamental piece in this model, establishing ownerships in the different tables
across the model. One of these tables, is the Probe table, and stores all the information directly
regarding the Probes linked to the system, such as, a text identifier, the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, the
status of the Probe (Active or Backup), the User that owns the Probe and a field that states if the
Probe ever encountered an anomaly. Connected to the Probe table, the Backup table stores two Probe
IDs and creates a relationship of the type Active-Backup between two Probes.
Alongside the Probes, two more tables save information in regard to the various types of Scripts
that can be uploaded via the website, one for Processing Scripts and another one for Monitoring
Scripts. The former stores all the Scripts that will be used Server-side to process incoming Results
and generate Alarms while the latter saves the Scripts that will be sent to the Probes, either for their
initialization or for Scripts that will run on the Probe and measure the various aspects of this project.
These tables have some columns that exist in both of them, with a Script being characterised with
a title and the path to the file containing the Script, a field that states if the Script is considered
Active or Inactive and a set of parameters to be used in the execution of the Scripts. By default, when
uploading a Script the User is given the option to choose the Server Name, the Probe IP and a List of
Targets to be added to the execution command but there is also a field to store additional parameters
that might be relevant to that specific Script. A Script, similar to the Probe, has an owner and, as
such, a field to store his ID. Finally, the table to store Monitoring Scripts contains an additional field to
differentiate Scripts that are used in the initialization of the Probe from Scripts that should be running
and performing tests. Associated with these Scripts, two more tables, Active Processing Scripts and
Active Monitoring Scripts, store pairs of Probe ID and Script ID in order to give the information to
the system where to run those same Scripts.
When the Monitoring Scripts are running at the Probes, they will collect measurements of some
kind that will be stored in the Results table. This table is currently focused on RTT measurements
and saves the timestamp for when the Result was taken as well the minimum, maximum, average
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and the deviation obtained in the measurement. It also saves what Probe collected the Result, what
was the Target of the measurement, what type of Result was collected and to what User this Result
belongs to. It also has a field to flag if the Result is considered anomalous by the Result Management
component. To store the various types of Results that can exist, an additional table stores the name
for all of them and it is linked to the type field in the Result table.
In the previous paragraph, the Target was mentioned. This table stores the User that added the
target and the IPv4 address for that Target. Finally, two tables store information regarding Alarms.
The Alarm Target table stores information with regard to a specific target, stating the time of the
Alarm, which Probe took the measurement and what was the Target Probed. The Alarm Probe table
gives the information about what Probes are collecting anomalous measurements and, as such, stores
only the timestamp and the Probe ID.
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Figure 3.3: Datamodel used in the project
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3.3 implementation
In order to implement the components and the datamodel addressed in the previous sections,
Python[47], in the version 2.7, was used as the programming language for the majority of the system
with the addition of the Django Framework.
Django can be described as "a high-level Python Web framework that encourages rapid development
and clean, pragmatic design"[48], especially focused on developers who want to set up their website
quickly and with the basic functionalities already operating. When deploying a Django project for the
first time, features as user registration and authentication, administration dashboard and database
connections are already in place, leaving the developer to focus on other features that differentiate
their systems. Inside of Django there are the concepts of project and apps, the former being the initial
folder to be created by Django and containing the Settings file that will hold all the configurations
necessary for the system, like the Database connector and credentials, apps installed to this project,
middleware available, among others, and a Python file to map Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) to
their corresponding apps, and the latter consisting of the web application that the developer is trying
to implement. A project can contain more than one app and one app can be deployed to more than
one project. To create this application, it is important to understand the concepts of Models, Views
and Templates and how they can be linked together using the URLs files present in the project and in
the app. This is actually close to the Model-View-Controller (MVC) design pattern, where "the model
is the data, the view is the window on the screen, and the controller is the glue between the two."[49],
however, the Django team explain themselves as a Model-Template-View (MTV) framework, where
the View is responsible for what data is seen rather than how it is seen[50].
A Model is a set of instructions that define how data is stored, their names and types, and other
functions that can be defined whenever necessary. After a model is defined, Django’s Object-relational
Mapper (ORM) translates them to the query language for the database in use. By default, Django is
made to support only with Relational Databases but there are third-party extensions that can offer
connections with some Non-Relational Databases, like MongoDB or Google App Engine. Simply put,
Models allow developers to write their data model using Python code.
View functions, or Views for short, are Python functions that support the logical side of the
application. Their input is a Request and they must output a Response, which may range from a 404
error to an image or, most commonly, the HTML content for a webpage[51]. It is up to the Views
to collect the necessary data through the querysets made available from the Models and link it to a
Template. After creating a View and making the connections to Models and Templates, the developer
must declare the URL that will call that View, in order to make it accessible.
Lastly, the Templates create what users see on the website, populated with the information sent
by the View in conjunction with the code present in them. These HTML Scripts can use, but is not
mandatory, a templating engine so that they can dynamically render the information passed through
the View. Django contains the Django Template Language (DTL) but it also supports Jinja2 [52] by
default. As with the databases, other template engines can be supported using third-party extensions.
Template files are able to support every HTML tag and/or the template engine tags, making them able
to support JavaScript, CSS and other useful tools. This creates a file that can hold static information
combined with loops, conditional clauses or objects from the database to dynamically assemble the
Response that will be shown on the webpage.
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3.3.1 database and user module
The database is supported by MariaDB, an open-source system forked by the original developers
of MySQL after its purchase by Oracle. MariaDB is intended to be compatible with MySQL binary
files, making it easy to replace it, even if the original development was made under MySQL system.
MariaDB is supported by default in Django and by using the Django’s ORM and the built-in functions,
the task of writing Structured Query Language (SQL) queries is removed from the developers. As such,
all of the operations that interact with tables, columns or rows from the database are Python code.
When starting a new Django project, and depending on some libraries or middlewares that can be
loaded into the Settings for the project, approximately 10 tables are created without the developer
interference. These tables store information regarding Users, Groups, permissions, sessions, among
other data and were used in this project as the User Module, removing the need to build one from zero.
Using these two components from the system, a set of three groups of users is defined in the system,
with the following names and permissions:
Regular User - This group of users can only login, change information details for their account and
list the existing Probes, Scripts and Alarms.
Server Admin - Adding to the Regular User permission, the Server Admin can also add, edit or
delete Probes and Scripts.
Superuser - Created in Django itself, rather than in the system. These group of users can access the
Django Admin Dashboard and manage Users and Groups of Users in the Authentication and
Authorization module (default in Django) and manage Probes, Scripts, Results and Alarms in
the Server module.
A Superuser must be created using the Linux terminal, in the folder where the file manage.py is
present, with the following command:
$ python manage . py c r e a t e supe ru s e r
And after inserting information regarding the username, email address and password for this
superuser, a new account is created with enough privileges to access the https://darteg.netconfs.
com/admin webpage. Also worth noting that, because Superusers are created on the command line
rather than the website, after creation they must be integrated into the Server Admin group to have
the same permissions regarding the view of the data.
3.3.2 result and management communication
As presented before, the system contains two components that provide endpoints to the Probes
interaction with the Server. Both the Result Communication as the Management Communication
are built upon the Django REST Framework (DRF), a user-built Django app that describes itself
as a "powerful and flexible toolkit for building Web APIs"[53] and it was used in this dissertation to
support operations following a Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. DRF offers a
built-in browsable API by default, it can be linked to the database in use with the Django project to
implement user authentication to the REST requests, serialisation of data based on JSON and several
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layers of complexity in their classes to allow developers to use simple GET or POST requests to built
their own logic in the API.
The Management Communication receives information from the Scripts that are tracking the
resource utilisation at the Probes and can make changes to the status of the Probe in the database.
This endpoint is located at https://darteg.netconfs.com/rest/Probes/, but should be addressed
as a PUT request to https://darteg.netconfs.com/rest/Probes/<Probe_id> containing a JSON
in the body of the request with the following format:
1 {
2 "ipv4_ip_address": <string >,
3 "status": <int >
4 }
The Probe ID in the URL in conjunction with the IP address in the body guarantee that is the
correct Probe that will be modified in the database and the Status field states if the Probe is being
activated (1) or deactivated (0). If a Backup Probe exists for the Probe being deactivated, it will be
set as Active in order to ensure the monitorization in that area.
The other component, the Result Management, is responsible for accepting new Results, writing
them in the database and alerting the Result Management and Alarms component that a new
result needs to be processed. The Probes can access this component through the URL https:
//darteg.netconfs.com/rest/results/ with a POST request that contains a JSON body with the
subsequent structure:
1 {
2 "op": <int >,
3 "Probe": <string >,
4 "target": <string >,
5 "timestamp": <datetime >,
6 "min": <decimal >,
7 "max": <decimal >,
8 "avg": <decimal >,
9 "var": <decimal >
10 }
Where the "Op" signalises the operation made by the Probe, and at this stage of the project, only
RTT measurements are supported which means that the "op" field should always be 1. Other options
are discarded by the server. In the future, more options can be added to support other types of tests.
The "probe" and "target" fields should both be IP addresses in the form of a string, the former serves
the purpose of identification of the Probe who is making the measurements and the latter establishes
what network was monitored in this measurement. The other five fields are straightforward, with the
"timestamp" being the date and time of the readings and "max", "min", "avg" and "var" representing
the maximum, minimum, average and the variance of the pings made by the Probe to the Target.
After saving the Result to the database, the Result Communication alerts the Result Management,
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through Python calls and passing the Result ID as part of the request.
3.3.3 probe management
An important part of the system is the perception that the Server has of the various Probes. This
is achieved by the Probe Management component, who is responsible for instantiating new Probes in
the database, edit or delete them, and to upload Scripts, either for initializing the Probe or to run tests.
The Probe Management also acts as the connection between the GUI, that needs User interaction, and
the rest of the system, that works in an automated way.
After a User uploads a file containing a Python or Bash Script to the website it will trigger the
Probe Management to start a task regarding that Script. A task, or background function, is a piece of
Python code that is running "behind the scenes" while some other functions are also being executed,
like, in the case of this project, the rendering of the website continues even if the task is running. These
tasks are implemented with the help of Celery, a distributed task queue based on message passing
to perform real-time operations but also able to support scheduling of operations[54]. A task queue
is designed to distribute work (tasks) across multiple threads or machines, with the workers always
listening to the queue until a new task arrives. To deliver this tasks, Celery uses a broker, which
resolves the communication between the system using Celery and the workers, and supports a wide
range of options. For this project, the broker used is Redis[55], a data structure store that can be
implemented to work as a message queue, a cache or even a database, being classified as a key-value
database (a Non-Relational model).
With this in mind, the Probe Management component has three tasks associated, two of them
performing the transfer of Scripts between the Server and the Probes and one pinging the Probes to
check for responsiveness. The latter is a really simple process that sends out Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) requests, more commonly known as pings, every 30 minutes and checks if the Probe
is still responding to them, while the former divides into a function that sends one Script to various
Probes, used after a new Script is uploaded to be used as a measurement Script, and another one that
sends several Scripts to one Probe, used after a new Probe is instantiated in the system and needs to
be initialized.
These connections are established using the paramiko library for Python, that provides helper
functions to open an SSH channel to the Probe. After that, an SCP channel is opened over the
transport provided by the SSH and the command is assembled with the parameters stored in the
database before being executed over the same SSH channel.
Due to the real Probes used in this dissertation having different distributions of Linux-based
Operating System (OS), with different package managers installed, the installation Scripts produced
in the scope of the project must cover all possibilities. These Scripts are available in appendix B.
3.3.4 result management and alarms
The last of the components that work autonomously is responsible for processing incoming Results
and generate Alarms according to the Scripts present at the Server. This component is alerted by the
Result Communication whenever a new Result is saved onto the database and it triggers a new task
for processing the Result. Inside of this task, the database is consulted to see if there is any Script
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uploaded by the User to process Results and, if the answer is negative, a default calculation is used,
which is presented in subsection 3.3.5.
If a new User or developer wishes to implement a new method of processing Results, the database
can be consulted by importing the correct Models and retrieving the necessary Results from the
database. Django’s ORM gives the option to retrieve one Result, all of the Results, or any number in
between:
from . models import Result
r e s u l t s = Result . ob j e c t s . all ( ) # Retrieves all of the
Results
r e s u l t s = Result . ob j e c t s . filter ( user=user_id ) # Retrieves the Results of
the User with that ID
r e s u l t = Result . ob j e c t s . get ( id=new_result_id ) # Retrieves the Result with
that ID
Different ways to gather data from the database can be consulted using the Django’s documenta-
tion[56].
On the other hand, after the calculations are made the Script must be able to save information
back to the database in order to set alarms. As before, the import should be done to load the correct
tables and then modify or create new entries in those tables:
from . models import Result , Alarm_Target , Alarm_Probe
r e s u l t = Result . ob j e c t s . get ( id=resu l t_ id ) # Retrieves the Result with
that ID
r e s u l t . anomalous = ’1’ # Sets the processed result as
anomalous
r e s u l t . save ( ) # Saves the changes to the
database
from django . u t i l s import t imezone
new_alarm = Alarm_Target ( t a r g e t=target_id , Probe=Probe_id ,
timestamp=timezone . now( ) ) # Creates a new Alarm regarding the
target and Probe passed
new_alarm . save ( ) # Saves the changes to the
database
new_alarm = Alarm_Probe ( Probe=Probe_id , timestamp=timezone . now( ) ) #
Creates a new Alarm regarding the target and Probe passed
new_alarm . save ( ) # Saves the changes to the
database
The save method should be called after all the modifications being made to ensure that they are
persisted to the database.
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3.3.5 default result processing
The default script for Result processing that was developed in the scope of this dissertation is
based on the formulas present on the article written by P. Salvador and A. Nogueira[57]. The authors
state that for each Probe p, who monitors n different networks during a time interval with t moments
since its upstart, it is possible to define the sets H, R and D.
H contains all the time instants where the Probe p monitored network n in the interval [t−H, t[,
with H being a parameter that can be adjusted.
When a Probe p pings a network n, it will collect the times from that ping. These RTT will be
stored in set R.
If a Result is found to contain an anomaly it will be part of the D and this deviation from the
normal RTT is calculated by
R > εr¯
where r¯ is
r¯ = 1
H
∑
t∈H∧t/∈D
R
This means that if the incoming result is higher than a constant ε times the average of the past H
RTT, it is suffering a deviation. If K consecutive Results show a deviation, the Probe is considered as
Anomalous and an Alarm is set on the database for Probe p, network n and timestamp t.
The epsilon used for this calculations, by default, is 1.2, k is 10 and H equals 480. This will force
the Results to be processed using the last 480 Results for that Probe and that Target and since every
ping is done with a 3 minute interval this means that the Script will use the Results in the last 24 hour
period, if all of them are in a normal state. If a Result is found to be anomalous, it will be excluded
from future calculations and force Results with more than 24 hours to appear in the set. The value
for k represents the number of consecutive deviations necessary for an alarm to be set, which is 10,
in this case. And the ε expresses the amount of error that is necessary for a Result to be considered
anomalous in relation to his predecessors. The value used by default, 1.2, means that the result must
be 20% higher than the average of the last RTTs to be considered anomalous. All of these values can
be changed to provide different insights over the data already stored in the database.
3.3.6 website and Graphical User Interface
To ensure a way for the Users to interact with the whole system, a website with a GUI was developed
using some of the tools provided by the Django framework. This website acts as an entrypoint for
the data insertion and in the same time allows users to consult data about the tests that are being
run and, if they have permission, to access the admin page in order to manage the Users and Groups
present in the system.
Every page in the website requires the user to be authenticated, redirecting the user to a login
form, except the Index page, shown in figure 3.4, that welcomes the User and instructs him to login.
The login form is a simple form containing a field for the username and another for the password.
After the User confirms the inserted credentials, is up to Django and the User Module to concede
permission to enter the website.
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Figure 3.4: Index page of the website
After the login process is complete, the User can start to access the various options offered by the
site in the bar located at the top of the page. This bar, shown in detail in figure 3.5 divides itself into
Probes, Scripts and Alarms, with the first two options expanding themselves to reveal the full set of
links available. The CSS code responsible for this bar was done by Mário Pina.
Figure 3.5: Top bar of the website
Inside of the Probes group, a user with full privileges will see options to "Add a Probe", "See the
List of Probes" and "Update Targets". In the Scripts group, it exists options for "Upload a Script",
"See where Scripts are running" and "See a List of Scripts". Finally, the Alarms is a single link, not
containing any more options. Figures 3.6a and 3.6b demonstrate these options.
(a) Options for the Probes option of the
bar
(b) Options for the Scripts option of the
bar
Figure 3.6: Options available in the bar of the website
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Explaining every item in more detail, if the user selects the "Add a Probe" option a form will be
shown with fields to create an identification tag (Identifier) for the Probe and to insert the IP address
where the Probe is located. Additionally, a two option field must be selected in order to categorise the
to-be added Probe as a Backup or an Active one. After the user confirms the submission, the Probe
Management component is triggered in order to ensure the correct initialization of the Probes.
If the user chooses to see a "List of Probes", a list containing the ID number in the database, the
identifier tag, the IP address for the Probe in question and its status is shown. If the user is a Server
Admin, a hyperlink to Edit Probe and another to remove it are shown.
The "Edit Probe" uses the same form as the Add option, but with the fields already filled. If
the edit is unintentional, the user can revert to the Probe list without any changes being made. The
"Delete Probe" triggers a warning message to the user, where he must confirm that the deletion is
intended. The actual process of deletion is handled by Django.
The final option, to "Update Targets", loads the current logged in user’s target list from the
database and displays it in a text box, with one target per line. The user can then edit them or even
remove the whole list.
Advancing onto the Script options, if the user selects to "Upload a Script" a new blank form
appears with seven fields to be filled. A text field to insert the title, a file prompt to select the Script
from the user’s file system, a two option field to categorise the Script as Active or Inactive (an Inactive
Script will not be considered for execution) and a three options field about the type of execution for
the Script, divided into "Probe init", "Probe run" and "Result analysis". This categorisation helps the
server deciding the role of each uploaded Script. Assuming the Script is also Active, a "Probe init"
Script is sent to a newly added Probe, using the "Add a Probe" option, a "Probe run" is sent to all
active Probes after being uploaded and a "Result analysis" is kept in the server to be executed when a
new result arrives from a Probe. All uploaded Scripts are written to the server’s Script system, under
a folder called "upload" located in the root directory of the project. If the Script added is of the type
"Probe run" a task is immediately set after the upload. The last three fields are checkboxes that will
state if the Script has any parameters to be added to the running command. Currently, this options
only affect Python Scripts and are the Server Name, Probe’s IP address and the List of user’s targets.
Similar to the Probes functionalities, a "List of Scripts" option also exists, where a list with the
title and the type of the Scripts is compiled to be shown to the user. With this list, options for seeing
the contents of the Scripts and, if the user belongs to the "Server admin" group, editing the various
Scripts, running it if the Script is of the type "Probe run" or remove the Script are also shown for each
individual Script. The Scripts are shown grouped by their type follow the order "Probe init", "Probe
run" and "Result analysis".
The "Show Script" feature calls a function created at the model level that parses the content of the
Script, line by line, and shows the contents of the Script along with its title and path.
Again, similarly to the Probes, the "Edit Script" makes use of the form already used in the creation,
but this time without the prompt to select a Script. This means that if the user mistakenly uploads
an incorrect Script, they should do a new upload. Also, the "Delete Script" prompts a message to the
user confirming that the deletion of the Script is the desired action, mimicking the behaviour of the
"Delete Probe" function.
If the user already uploaded a Script but, for some reason, it is necessary to run it again on the
active Probes, selecting the "See where Scripts are running" option will prompt the user to a new page
where it is possible for the user to select a Script. After the selection is made, the system inquiries
every Probe to see if the Script is actually running or not, and returns the result in two tables, for
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"Running" or "Not Running". After that, the user has the option to move Probes from one table
to another and to change the running parameters for that specific Script. After all the changes are
made, a button in the bottom of the page allows the user to submit the changes. The majority of the
functions and aspect of this page were a contribution from Mário Pina.
Lastly, the "Alarms" gathers the information about the alarms detected, showing which Probe
triggered the alarm, for what target network the alarm was set and the timestamp when the alarm
occurred. If no Alarms are available, a message is presented to the user stating this situation.
In case that the user is a Superuser, the Django Admin page is available. In this page, generated
by default when a Django project is initiated, the user can access all records stored in the database,
edit them and create new ones. This allows Superusers to manage the users registered in the system
and their permissions, based on the Groups where they have a membership, and to supervise the data
that is being stored in the database by the different actors in the system.
3.3.7 https support
HTTPS, or HTTP over TLS[58], is a protocol that operates over Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) to guarantee authentication of the websites and the encryption of the data being transferred.
In the specific case of this project, HTTPS is implemented directly in the Apache’s httpd con-
figuration. Using the default port 443, httpd redirects every request received as plain HTTP to a
https : // variant. The certificate used to support this protocol is a self-signed one, generated using
the functionalities provided by OpenSSL and employing a 2048-bits RSA key. The full configuration
can be found on Appendix A.
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chapter 4
Results
After the completion of the implementation phase of the project, the Server needed to be deployed
in order to be available to the Users and a set of Probes installed in order to perform measurements.
For this purpose, 20 different VPS were acquired and configured according to the requirements of the
dissertation. On of these VPS was used to host the Server, with the remaining 19 acting as Probes. If
two or more Probes are located in the same city, only one of them is configured as Active.
Table 4.1 details the capabilities of theses VPSs, such as, their memory, disk space, bandwidth
and OS.
City Country Cores Memory (Mb) Disk Space (Gb) Bandwidth (Mbps) Operating System
Server Frankfurt Germany 2 1024 20 500 Ubuntu 14.04
Probes
Frankfurt Germany 1 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Chicago U.S.A. 2 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Chicago U.S.A. 1 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Los Angeles U.S.A. 2 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Los Angeles U.S.A. 1 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
São Paulo Brazil 2 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
São Paulo Brazil 1 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Johannesburg South Africa 2 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Johannesburg South Africa 1 1024 20 500 CentOS 6
Chile 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Madrid Spain 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Hong Kong China 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Israel 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Iceland 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Milan Italy 1 512 2 250 Ubuntu 14.04
Amsterdam Netherlands 1 512 2 250 Ubuntu 14.04
Moscow Russia 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Sweden 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
London United Kingdom 1 512 2 250 Debian 8
Table 4.1: Location, capabilities and OS of each VPS
As explained in subsection 3.3.3, these Probes are initialised with scripts uploaded by the Users,
but for the scope of this dissertation, two scripts were already provided to them and they can be found
on Appendix A.
In addition to the Probes, a set of Targets had to be selected to perform the RTT measurements
for this project. These addresses, shown on table 4.2 were collected on one of many providers of servers
and cloud services[59] and ensure a large enough set of Targets with enough disparity on the globe to
provide meaningful measurements.
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Location IP Address
London 85.115.52.180
Frankfurt 85.115.56.180
Mumbai 116.50.59.180
Paris 85.115.60.180
Dusseldorf 85.115.58.180
Geneva 58.115.62.180
San Jose 208.87.233.180
Ashburn 208.87.234.180
Istanbul 85.115.32.180
Slough 85.115.54.180
Hong Kong 116.50.57.180
Sydney 116.50.58.180
Chicago 208.87.237.180
Dallas 208.87.239.180
Sao Paulo 177.39.96.180
Miami 208.87.238.180
Singapore 116.50.60.180
Johannesburg 196.216.238.180
Tokyo 116.50.61.180
Amsterdam 85.115.33.180
Table 4.2: Location and IP address of each target
4.1 results obtained
Using the method described in the previous chapter, associated with the Probes and Targets
presented before, the measurements of the RTTs ran since the 30th of June until the time of this
writing. More than 600 thousand Results were collected and processed in order to discover anomalies
and raise alarms.
Using the default values of ε = 1, 2, k = 10 and H = 480, 3081 Results were flagged as anomalous
and 120 Alarms were set, with the majority of them based on the Probe of Moscow to the Target in
Tokyo and Probe of Chile to various targets.
If the threshold is lowered to ε = 1, 1, the number of detections rises to 4055 anomalous Results
with 419 Alarms.
To demonstrate the type of detection done in the scope of this dissertation, several graphics were
prepared with the Results present in the database. Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show measurements done
from London, Hong Kong and Los Angeles to Chicago with the two thresholds mentioned before and
figure 4.4 having the three RTT measurements in the same graphic. Similarly, figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7
give the same information from Moscow, Madrid and Chicago to Tokyo, with figure 4.8 grouping the
three graphics in one.
Figure 4.1 clearly shows an anomaly happening during the 13th of July. However, the RTT before
and after the anomaly drops from approximately 94 ms to 92 ms, which can lead to conclude that this
is not an attack but rather a rerouting performed by the provider, with the spike in the RTT being,
most likely, a convergence process in the network. Furthermore, analysing figure 4.4 shows that the
other two Probes didn’t observe any anomalies near that period.
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On figure 4.2, only one anomaly is detected when using the default threshold, but when lowering
this ceiling to ε = 1, 1 anomalies are detected in, at least, two more occasions, with a third one
happening near the 3rd of July but without sufficient data to set the threshold. When comparing with
the other two probes, in figure 4.4, it is visible that the anomaly near the 11th of July is also captured
by the Probe located in Los Angeles.
The last Probe analysed in this set is located in Los Angeles. Because of the proximity between the
Probe and the Target, the RTT is very low, thus any deviation can provoke an anomaly. Nonetheless,
near the 7th of July the values of the RTTs nearly quintupled, with two more occurrences during the
first 15 days of July with the values rising four times more than the average. This can be explained by
some type of load balacing, internal network congestion or other non-malicious factors, because on
figure 4.4, only the anomaly on the 12th of July is detected by other Probe, Hong Kong.
Figure 4.1: Measurements from Probe London to Target Chicago
Figure 4.2: Measurements from Probe Hong Kong to Target Chicago
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Figure 4.3: Measurements from Probe Los Angeles to Target Chicago
Figure 4.4: Measurements from Probes London, Hong Kong and Los Angeles to Target
Chicago
Passing to the Target in Tokyo, figure 4.5 shows a curious situation near the 5th of July, where,
with enough data, the system could detect an anomaly but further human observation can pinpoint
this change in the RTT as a rerouting of traffic. This is further supported by figure 4.8 because no
other Probe detects an anomaly on that date. Nonetheless, on the 8th of July, a spike in the values of
the RTTs was not flagged by the system but figure 4.5 supports the theory of an anomaly happening
because all three Probes show an increase in the values returned.
The Probe located in Madrid, represented in figure 4.6, shows a very homogeneous behaviour in
the values, with the deviations from the average not exceeding 10 ms. The only situation worth noting
was already approached in the previous paragraph.
Finally, in figure 4.7 shows the Probe located in Chicago having several isolated cases of anomalies
but not enough consecutive ones to raise an Alarm. It also provides a drop in the RTT in the order of
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10 ms during the 6th and 7th of July and then a permanent alteration during the night between the
13th and 14th of July, with no more changes being perceivable. This change is not reflected on any
other Probe present on figure 4.8, which can lead to the conclusion of being an act conducted by the
provider.
Figure 4.5: Measurements from Probe Moscow to Target Tokyo
Figure 4.6: Measurements from Probe Madrid to Target Tokyo
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Figure 4.7: Measurements from Probe Chicago to Target Tokyo
Figure 4.8: Measurements from Probes Moscow, Madrid and Chicago to Target Tokyo
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chapter 5
Conclusion
During the course of this dissertation, a system that is capable of monitoring a worldwide protocol
using a low cost, easy to deploy solution was implemented.
Because of the flawed nature of BGP, it was necessary to build a system that would bring some
information to users that could not access the BGP layer of their network, which represents all the
domestic users and a large part of corporate clients.
Making use of 20 different VPSs spread through three continents, a Server and a set of Probes
are constantly tracking the time it takes for the packet to flow on the Internet and trying to detect
abnormal spikes in the travel time (RTT). Another dissertation was also involved in this system, in
order to monitor the resource utilisation of the probes and to prevent the use of bad measurements in
the Result analysis.
5.1 future work
This work is subject to new features in order to expand the existing functionalities present in the
Server. This could mean adding support to new measurements in the Probes, such as traceroutes,
port mappings, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests, among others, with the proper reception
by the webservices, the usage of cryptographic keys to access the probes, which removes the need to
use passwords in the server side, or simply the revamp of the look-and-feel of the website to further
increase user interaction.
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Appendix A: Server
Installation Manual
In order to install the Server in another VPS, different packages and libraries must installed. In the
aptitude package manager (or the equivalent for the OS used):
$ apt−get i n s t a l l python−pip
$ apt−get i n s t a l l apache2
$ apt−get i n s t a l l l ibapache2−mod−wsgi
$ apt−get i n s t a l l l i b f f i −dev
$ apt−get i n s t a l l python−dev
$ apt−get i n s t a l l mariadb−s e r v e r
$ apt−get i n s t a l l l i bmar i adbc l i en t−dev
$ apt−get i n s t a l l l i b s s l −dev
And in the Python Package Manager, also known as pip, the virtual environment module should
be installed and configured:
$ pip i n s t a l l v i r t ua l env
$ v i r tua l env dartegenv
$ source dartegenv /bin / a c t i v a t e
$ pip i n s t a l l django
$ pip i n s t a l l d jangorest framework
$ pip i n s t a l l markdown
$ pip i n s t a l l django− f i l t e r
$ pip i n s t a l l c e l e r y
$ pip i n s t a l l r e d i s
$ pip i n s t a l l mysq l c l i en t
$ pip i n s t a l l paramiko
$ pip i n s t a l l scp
$ pip i n s t a l l pycrypto
To install MariaDB, there is a need to configure the database with:
$ mysq l_secure_ins ta l l a t i on
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$ mysql −u root −p
And then, inside the MariaDB shell:
CREATE DATABASE <name> CHARACTER SET UTF8;
CREATE USER <user>@loca lhos t IDENTIFIED BY <password >;
GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON <name>.∗ TO <user>@loca lhos t ;
FLUSH PRIVILEGES ;
Finally, in the folder that stores the Django code, the following commands should be applied:
$ python manage . py makemigrations
$ python manage . py migrate
$ python manage . py c r e a t e supe ru s e r
However, if the Server is to be served by httpd, to mimic this project, a conf.d file should be
prepared to handle http and https requests. For this project, the following configuration was used:
<Virtua lHost ∗:80>
ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost
DocumentRoot /var /www/html/ darteg
ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/ e r r o r . l og
CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/ ac c e s s . l og combined
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{SERVER_PORT} !^443 $
RewriteRule ^ ( . ∗ ) $ https ://%{HTTP_HOST}$1 [R=301 ,L ]
ServerName darteg . ne t con f s . com
</VirtualHost>
<Virtua lHost ∗:443>
ServerName darteg . ne t con f s . com
Al i a s / s t a t i c /var /www/html/ darteg / s t a t i c
<Direc tory /var /www/html/ darteg / s t a t i c >
Require a l l granted
</Directory>
<Direc tory /var /www/html/ darteg / darteg/>
<F i l e s wsgi . py>
Require a l l granted
</F i l e s >
</Directory>
WSGIDaemonProcess darteg
python−path=/var /www/html/ darteg : / var /www/html/ darteg / dartegenv / l i b /python2 .7/ s i t e−packages
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WSGIProcessGroup darteg
WSGIScriptAlias / /var /www/html/ darteg / darteg /wsgi . py
process−group=darteg
WSGIScriptReloading On
SSLEngine on
SSLCe r t i f i c a t eF i l e /var /www/html/ darteg / c e r t . pem
SSLCer t i f i ca t eKeyF i l e /var /www/html/ darteg / p r i va t e . pem
SSLCACert i f i cateFi l e /var /www/html/ darteg / c e r t . pem
</VirtualHost>
To generate a s e l f −s igned c e r t i f i c a t e to use as the SSL c e r t i f i c a t e , the
f o l l ow i n g command must be executed :
\ begin { l s t l i s t i n g } [ language=bash ]
$ opens s l req −x509 −nodes −days 365 −newkey r sa :2048 −keyout
/ e tc / s s l / p r i va t e /apache−s e l f s i g n e d . key −out
/ e tc / s s l / c e r t s /apache−s e l s i g n e d . c r t
This configuration file will take all http requests and redirect them to the https port. In that port,
the file has the configurations needed to fetch the correct files for the project, as well as the certificate
and private key used in it. After this file is placed in the sites-avaialable folder of apache, the following
commands finish the process:
$ chown :www−data ~/ darteg
$ a2 en s i t e <con f i g u r a t i o n_ f i l e >. conf
$ python manage . py c o l l e c t s t a t i c
$ s e r v i c e apache2 r e s t a r t
The Server is now ready to be used.
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Appendix B: Probe
Initialisation Scripts
To ensure the correct functioning of the Probes when the measurement scripts arrive, and because of
the different OSs present in this project, two minor scripts with packages to be installed were created.
For Debian-based OSs:
$ apt−get i n s t a l l −y python2 . 7
$ apt−get i n s t a l l −y python−pip
$ pip i n s t a l l −y r eque s t s
And for Probes with CentOS:
$ yum i n s t a l l −y epel−r e l e a s e
$ yum i n s t a l l −y python−pip
$ pip i n s t a l l r e que s t s
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